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ARTICLES
DOCTOR, ARE YOU EXPERIENCED? THE
RELEVANCE OF DISCLOSURE OF
PHYSICIAN EXPERIENCE TO A VALID
INFORMED CONSENT
By Emmanuel 0. Iheukwumere, Esquire*
INTRODUCTION
The informed consent doctrine has been a topic of continuing debate
and controversy since the seminal case of Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr.
University Board of Trustees' first recognized the doctrine and used the
* Eaton & McClellan, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. B.A., summa cum
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School of Law. A frequent commentator in the areas of civil litigation, his
writings on affirmative action, medical malpractice, prescription drugs
liability, and admissibility of scientific evidence, etc., have appeared in
several law reviews/journals. His latest law review article entitled
Application of the Corporate Negligence Doctrine to Managed Care
Organizations: Sound Public Policy or Judicial Overkill? appeared in the
summer 2001 issue of the Catholic University Journal of Contemporary
Health Law and Policy, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 585 (2001).
His article on affirmative action (with Prof. Philip Aka), entitled Title VII,
Affirmative Action and the March Towards Color-Blind Jurisprudence is
forthcoming in the Temple Political and Civil Rights Law Review. Mr.
Iheukwumere dedicates this article to his children, Jane, Emmanuel, Jr.,
and Marshall. In addition, he dedicates this article to Margaret Taylor,
and to the memory of Ka-Rin Alise Taylor. He acknowledges the kind
support of Eaton & McClellan's senior partners, Frank M. McClellan,
Esquire, who is also the I. Herman Stern Professor of Law at Temple
University School of Law, and Allen T. Eaton, Esquire, and the following
individuals, Brian F. Holeman, Esquire, La'Vern D. Wiley, Esquire,
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term "informed consent."2  However, the seed for the doctrine was
arguably sewn in Schloendorff v. Society of the New York Hospital where
then Judge, and later Justice Benjamin Cardozo uttered his venerable
statement that "every human being of adult years and sound mind has a
right to determine what shall be done with his own body., 4 Since its
original adoption, the doctrine, which requires a practitioner to inform a
patient of all material risks, benefits, and alternatives attendant upon a
proposed treatment option and to disclose to the patient the risks of a
failure to go through with a recommended procedure5 has been expanded
over the years.
This article argues that public policy militates in favor of requiring
practitioners to disclose their levels of experience to inquiring patients in
order to comply with the requirements of informed consent. Before
arriving at this conclusion, this article examines the history of doctor-
patient communication, judicial treatment of the informed consent
doctrine since its adoption in Salgo, and then analyzes the relevance of
physician experience in the informed consent inquiry.
Mballe M. Nkembe, Esquire, Oluwakemi Adeleye, Esquire, Linda C.
King, Esquire, Anne Marie Pompey, Sabrina Easterling, Patty Williams,
Courtney Newman, and Latasha Thomas. He also acknowledges the
helpful research assistance of Mr. Nkembe. Finally, he thanks the
editorial staff of this journal, especially lead articles editor Andrea Sudell,
for superb editorial assistance.
1. 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).
2. See Sheldon F. Kurtz, The Law of Informed Consent: From "Doctor is
Right" to "Patient has Rights," 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1243, 1244 (2000)
[hereinafter Kurtz, The Law of Informed Consent] (noting that Salgo v. Leland
was the first case to recognize the concept of informed consent); Laurel R.
Hanson, Note: Informed Consent and the Scope of A Physician's Duty of
Disclosure, 77 N.D. L. REV. 71, 72 (2001) (observing that Salgo v. Leland was the
first appellate court to use the term "informed consent").
3. 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914). See also Lambert v. Park, 597 F.2d 236, 237, n. 1
(10 " Cir. 1979) (asserting that the informed consent doctrine is traceable in part to
judge, later, Justice Benjamin Cardozo's statement in Schloendorff).
4. See Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93.
5. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786-87 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Emmanuel 0. Iheukwumere, HIV-Positive Medical Practitioners: Legal and
Ethical Obligations to Disclose, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 715, 719 (1997) [hereinafter
Iheukwumere, HIV-Positive Medical Practitioners].
Doctor, Are You Experienced?
II. INFORMED CONSENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY: FROM
CONSENT TO INFORMED CONSENT
Although a substantial majority of contemporary physicians agree, as
do most patients, that the right of patients to informed consent is so
paramount that it deserves legal protection,' and although the informed
consent doctrine is now well established in all the jurisdictions of the
United States,7 the march towards the judicial adoption of the informed
consent doctrine was painstakingly slow. This slow evolution may have
been due to the traditional opposition and paternalism of the medical
profession to any disclosure requirements.8 This paternalism dates back
to the legendary Greek physician Hippocrates, whose oath many
physicians take and are expected to abide by.9 Apparently Hippocrates
was so mistrustful of patients, and disdainful of their inability to
understand medically what needed to be done with their own bodies, that
he believed it was imperative for physicians to hide most of the facts of
6. See Louis Harris & Associates, Views of Informed Consent and
Decisionmaking: Parallel Surveys of Physicians and the Public, in II PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, at App. B, Table 5-15, cited in Kurtz,
The Law of Informed Consent, supra note 2, at 1254 (reporting that 89% of
patients and 76% of physicians believe that the right to informed consent is so
crucial that it deserves legal protection).
7. See Ketchup v. Howard, 543 S.E. 2d 371, 373 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)
(observing that up to the time this opinion was handed down, all of the states, with
the exception of Georgia, recognized the informed consent doctrine). In Ketchup,
the Georgia Court of Appeals overruled its prior decision in Young v. Yarn, 222
S.E.2d 113 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975) which had rejected the requirement of informed
consent in Georgia. After an unreasonable delay in recognizing the right of
patients to material information and alternatives to proposed medical procedures,
Georgia finally became the last state to adopt the common law doctrine of
informed consent.
8. See Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era of
Health Care Cost Containment, 85 IOWA L. REV. 261, 273 (1999) (observing that
"physicians traditionally have not viewed patients as capable of making
appropriate decisions about their own care."). See also Ladonna L. Griffith,
Informed Consent: Patient's Right to Comprehend, 27 How. L. J. 975, 975 (1984)
(noting that "at one point in medical history, the clichd 'Doctor Knows Best' was
simply accepted.").
9. See 2 HIPPOCRATES, DECORUM 297 (W. Jones trans., Harvard Univ. Press
1967), cited in Kurtz, The Law of Informed Consent, supra note 2, at 1243.
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treatment and outcomes from them.' ° Other early great thinkers such as
Plato echoed Hippocrates. For example, Plato saw nothing wrong with a
physician lying to the patient, provided the rationale behind the lie was to
advance allegedly "good and noble purposes."" Based on the positions of
these ancient and venerable thinkers, it is no surprise that such esteemed
pioneers of American medicine as Benjamin Rush embraced physician
12paternalism towards patients on the issue of consent with open arms. Dr.
Rush argued passionately about the necessity of absolute physician
authority over the patient, while divulging as little as possible to the
patient regarding the patient's own condition." Significantly, Rush was
viewed as highly enlightened in his day. 4 Such views perhaps persuaded
the American Medical Association ("AMA") to promulgate a code of
ethics enjoining physicians from disclosing to the patient a gloomy
prognosis of the patient's condition. The AMA code, which was adopted
in 1847 provided in relevant part:
A physician should not be forward to make gloomy
prognostications, because they savor of empiricism, by
magnifying the importance of his services in the treatment or
cure of the disease. But he should not fail, on proper occasions,
to give to the friends of the patient timely notice of danger when
it really occurs; and even to the patient himself, if absolute
necessary... For, the physician should be the minister of hope
and comfort to the sick; that... he may smooth the bed of
death, revive expiring life, and counteract the depressing
influence of those maladies which often disturb the tranquility
of the most resigned in their last moments. The life of a sick
person can be shortened not only by the acts, but also by the
words or the manner of the physician. It is, therefore, a sacred
10. See id. at 1243 (noting that Hippocrates cautioned physicians to hide
"most things from the patient while you are attending to him ... revealing nothing
of the patient's future or present condition").
11. See JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOcTOR AND PATIENT (1984), cited
in Kurtz, The Law of Informed Consent, supra note 2, at 1243 (noting that Plato
viewed one of the vital roles of the physician as the employment of lies to
persuade the patient to accept recommended treatment, and to use lies
[deception] to achieve "good and noble purposes.").
12. See KATZ, supra note 11, at 16, cited in Kurtz, The Law of Informed
Consent, supra note 2, at 1244. Id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
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duty to guard himself carefully in this respect, and to avoid all
things which have a tendency to discourage the patient and to
depress his spirits. 5
Not content with this level of paternalism, which was perhaps well-
intentioned, and intent on fostering the absolute supremacy of the
physician over the care of the patient, the same AMA code of ethics
enjoined patients from questioning the opinions of their physicians no
mater how unreasonable they may appear by proclaiming: "[t]he
obedience of a patient to the prescriptions of his physicians should be
prompt and implicit. He should never permit his own crude opinions as to
their fitness, to influence his attention to them."'6
This paternalistic AMA code of ethics remained essentially unrevised
until 1980. Unfortunately for patients, the judiciary was all too willing to
put its imprimatur on physician paternalism. However, as early as 1889 at
least one jurisdiction, Maryland, required physicians to consult with and
obtain the consent of the patient prior to a surgical procedure. 7 Through
the middle part of the twentieth century, judicial attitudes in other
jurisdictions changed slowly in requiring basic consent to surgical
procedures." Although Justice Cardozo made his venerable statement in
Schloendorff in 1914,19 and other jurisdictions had by this time recognized
the right of a patient to consent prior to surgery, judicial approaches to
the issue of consent prior to the Salgo decision were limited to the basic
consent requirement in a battery analysis, and were generally saturated
with paternalistic overtones. For example, consider the following case. In
15. See CODE OF ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N (1847), ch. 1, art
1, cited in Kurtz, The Law of Informed Consent, supra note 2, at 1244.
16. See id.
17. See State v. Housekeeper, 16 A. 382 (Md. 1889).
18. See, e.g., Pratt v. Davis, 79 N.E. 2d 562 (Ill. 1906); Schloendorf v. Soc'y of
N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914); Barfield v. South Highlands Infirmary, 68
So. 30 (Ala. 1915); Mosciuki v. Shor, 163 A. 341 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1932); Hunt v.
Bradshaw, 88 S.E.2d 762 (N.C. 1955).
19. See Schloendorff, 105 N.E.2d 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
20. See also Bryan J. Warren, Comment.- Pennsylvania Medical Informed
Consent Law: A Call to Protect Patient Autonomy Rights by Abandoning the
Battery Approach, 38 DuQ. L. REV. 917, 927-29 (2000) (observing that the early
judicial approaches to consent were premised on battery, and limited to the
requirement of bare consent); D. Scott Porch, IV, Note: Recent Developments in
Tennessee's Doctrine of Informed Consent, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 593, 595 (2000).
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Barfield v. South Highlands Infirmary, et al,2 an Alabama case, the
evidence revealed, and the defendant surgeon even admitted that the
2patient had vociferously objected to the amputation of her leg.
Notwithstanding the patient's apparent lack of consent, the Alabama
Supreme Court exonerated the surgeon on the dubious ground that there
was allegedly a conversation where the patient's mother later indicated
that her daughter had consented.2' Further, the Court rationalized that in
light of the seriousness of the plaintiff's condition, "it was proper for
defendant to consult with the mother - and not conceivably improper in
any event - [and] to act upon her consent as the implied consent of
plaintiff. 2 4 Finally, demonstrating that its ruling was influenced more by
paternalistic tendencies (though perhaps well-intentioned) and indicating
an absence of any consideration for the plaintiff's right to decide what
should be done with her own body, the Barfield court emphasized that,
"considerations of custom, humanity, and reason," militated in favor of
finding the defendant-surgeon not liable.25 Significantly, there was no
indication from the opinion that the patient was either a minor or in a
situation where she was objectively incapable of consent.
Consider also Hunt v. Bradshaw," a North Carolina case where the
plaintiff alleged, among other things, that the surgeon failed to advise him
of the seriousness of the contemplated surgery. The surgery resulted in
severe injury to the patient. Although the court determined that the
plaintiff's evidence established that the "damage to plaintiff's hand and
arm resulted from the operation," 7 this alone was not sufficient. The
Court explained,
[iut is understandable the surgeon wanted to reassure the patient
so that he would not go to the operating room unduly
apprehensive. Failure to explain the risks involved, therefore,
may be considered a mistake on the part of the surgeon, but
21. Barfield, 68 So. 30 (Ala. 1915).
22. See id. at 35 (noting that the patient declared "that she would rather die
than have her leg cut off, it may be said, further, that there was no denial, but that
plaintiff long persisted in her refusal to have the operation performed. Defendant
himself testified to that.") (emphasis added).
23. Id.
24. See id. at 35.
25. See id. at 36.
26. 88 S.E.2d 762 (N.C. 1955).
27. See id. at 523-24.
Doctor, Are You Experienced?
under the facts cannot be deemed such want of ordinary care as
to import liability.28
Completely absent from the court's consideration was a recognition of
the patient's autonomy and right to bodily integrity. Nor did the court
consider the necessity of providing the patient with the information
necessary to decide Whether or not to proceed with the surgery.
Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hospita 9 is a compelling example of brazen
physician indifference to the right of the patient to determine what should
be done with his own body. The evidence in Bang revealed that the
plaintiff began having urinary difficulties from 1951 to 1952. Seeking
medical intervention, the plaintiff consulted with a local physician who
referred him to a local hospital. Two physicians at the local hospital in the
plaintiff's hometown of Austin, Minnesota apparently diagnosed his
condition as an enlarged prostate and bladder soreness and recommended
the defendant-hospital situated in St. Paul for tissue removal to correct
the plaintiff's problems. Plaintiff, however, consulted with the defendant-
physician in St. Paul who allegedly indicated to the patient that he was
unsure of the exact nature of the plaintiffs problems, but advised
admission to the defendant-hospital for a possible prostate surgery.
According to the defendant-physician's own admission, without
informing the plaintiff-patient of the nature of prostate surgery, the
defendant not only performed the surgery, but intentionally cut the
patient's spermatic cords, rendering him sterile. Notwithstanding the
admissions of the defendant, especially with regard to not informing the
patient that he would sever his spermatic cords, the trial court dismissed
the patient's action. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Minnesota
appropriately held that "the question as to whether plaintiff consented to
the severance of his spermatic cords was a fact question for the jury and
that it was error for the trial court to dismiss the action."30 In addition, the
court emphasized "that a reasonable rule is that, where a physician or
surgeon can ascertain in advance of an operation alternative situations
and no immediate emergency exists, a patient should be informed of the
alternative possibilities and given a chance to decide before the doctor
proceeds with the operation."3 Significantly, however, the court did not
28. See id.
29. 88 N.W.2d 186 (Minn. 1958).
30. Id. at 189.
31. Id. at 190.
2002]
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explain whether the disclosure was to be based on the physician standard
or the patient standard.
Notwithstanding the paternalistic approach of the many pre-Salgo
cases, there were few exceptions to the paternalistic bandwagon. For
example, in Hunter v. Burroughs,32 a Virginia case decided almost forty
years prior to Salgo, the evidence revealed that following a bout of
eczema, the plaintiff-patient consulted the defendant-physician for a
treatment option.33 The defendant advised the plaintiff that the newly
developed x-ray treatment was appropriate for his condition. However,
the evidence further revealed that the defendant neither informed the
patient of the risk of skin burns from the application of the x-ray to the
patient's legs and ankles, nor applied the x-rays to the patient in
accordance with the standard of care to which even he, the defendant,
testified.34 The court agreed with the plaintiff-patient's contention "that it
is the duty of a physician in the exercise of ordinary care to warn a patient
of the danger of possible bad consequences of using a remedy."3
III. PHYSICIAN OR PATIENT STANDARD? THE BATTLE FOR
THE STANDARD OF DISCLOSURE
After the judicial adoption of the informed consent doctrine in Salgo,
the focus shifted to whether the standard of disclosure should be based on
what a reasonable physician or reasonable patient would consider
material to an informed decision. Although Salgo held in pertinent part
that "[a] physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to
liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the basis of
,,36
an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treatment, and
emphasized that "the physician may not minimize the known dangers of a
procedure in order to induce his patient's consent, 3 7 it is not clear
whether Salgo adopted the reasonable physician or patient standard of
disclosure. Based on the ambiguity of Salgo with respect to the type of
standard adopted, the struggle shifted to a determination of whether the
32. 96 S.E. 360 (Va. 1918).
33. Id. at 366.
34. Id. at 366-67, 369.
35. Id. at 366.
36. See Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Tr., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
37. See id.
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extent of disclosure should be left to the physicians, who had historically
insisted on absolute supremacy over what should be done with the
patient's own body, or be decided on the basis of what a reasonable
patient would consider material in deciding whether or not to undergo a
recommended treatment.
In the first major case on informed consent after Salgo, the Kansas
Supreme Court decided that the physician was better equipped to
determine what information should be disclosed to the patient. Three
years after Salgo, in the seminal case of Natanson v. Kline18 the court,
while adopting the informed consent doctrine, made it clear that it was
imposing the physician standard.39 Natanson is significant not only for
being the first to adopt the physician standard,: but for the exemplary
display of paternalism by the defendant-physician. The facts revealed that
following a radical left mastectomy as a result of breast cancer, the patient
came under the care of radiologist, defendant Dr. John R. Kline, for the
application of radiation therapy to the site of the mastectomy and the
surrounding areas.4 The radiation therapy, involving application of
radioactive cobalt, was fairly new in use. 4' This therapy was so powerful
when compared to ordinary x-ray treatments, which were then theS 41
traditional radiation treatment for cancer patients, that the cobalt
machine was compared to "a three million volt X ray machine." 4 In
38. See generally, Natanson v. Klien, 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960). No
explanation needed.
39. See id. at 1106 (emphasizing "In our opinion the proper rule of law to
determine whether a patient has given an intelligent consent to a proposed form
of treatment by a physician was stated and applied in Salgo v. Leland Stanford,
Etc. Bd. Trustees []. This rule in effect compels disclosure by the physician in
order to assure that an informed consent of the patient is obtained. The duty of
the physician to disclose, however, is limited to those disclosures which a
reasonable medical practitioner would make under the same or similar
circumstances.") (emphasis added).
40. See Porch, supra note 20, at 596 (observing that Natanson v. Kline
represents the first adoption of the physician standard of disclosure).
41. See Natanson, 350 P. 2d at 1095.
42. See id. at 1101 (observing "The treatment of a cancer patient with
radioactive cobalt is relatively new.").
43. See id.
44. See id. According to the opinion, the Atomic Energy Commission
specified the construction of the room where the machine was housed, and
required the filing of periodic reports of radiation outside the room. The room
20021
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addition, application of the cobalt radiation required a rotating beam,
which necessitated the assistance of a specialist in physics. 5 Despite these
facts, the defendant, Dr. Kline, did not inform the patient that the
treatment involved any danger of serious bodily injury.46 Rather, he
admitted that he knew that he was "taking a chance" with the proposed
treatment.47 Although the opinion did not explicitly indicate that Dr.
Kline acted in complete disregard of the patient's right to determine what
was to be done with her own body, there was no indication that the
patient was advised of any alternative treatment options either. In the
course of the application of the cobalt radiation, which plaintiff alleged
was negligently done, plaintiff-patient's "entire chest, skin, cartilage, and
bone were completely destroyed in those areas, 48 and the "ribs of her left
chest were so burned that they became necrotic, or dead. 49
Addressing the issue of "whether the physician ... obtained the
informed consent of the patient to render the treatment administered,"' °
the court emphasized "a patient cannot be expected to know the hazards
or the danger of radiation from radioactive cobalt unless the patient is
informed by a radiologist who knows the dangers of injury from cobalt
irradiation."5' After observing that, "[a] doctor might well believe that an
operation or form of treatment is desirable or necessary but the law does
not permit him to substitute his own judgment for that of the patient by
any form of artifice or deception," the court cited Salgo with approval,"
and held
was located underground outside the hospital, and the walls were made of forty
inches thick concrete. Even the ceiling was made of concrete so thick that it
measured twenty-four inches. Adding to the sense of foreboding of the
surroundings was the fact that "when the radiation treatment is administered to a
patient, the operator in the outer room looks through a specially designed thick
lead quartz glass which gives a telescopic view." Id.
45. See id. at 1096-97.
46. See id. at 1100.
47. See id. at 1100.
48. Id. at 1097.
49. Id. at 1098.
50. Id. at 1101.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1106 (stressing "In our opinion the proper rule of law to determine
whether a patient has given an intelligent consent to a proposed form of treatment
by a physician was stated and applied in Salgo v. Leland Stanford, Etc. Bd.
Trustees.").
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upon all the facts and circumstances here presented Dr. Kline
was obligated to make a reasonable disclosure to the appellant
of the nature and probable consequences of the suggested or
recommended cobalt irradiation treatment, and he was also
obligated to make a reasonable disclosure of the dangers within
his knowledge which were incident to, or possible in, the
treatment he proposed to administer."
Perhaps more importantly on the applicable standard, the court
emphasized, "[t]he duty of the physician to disclose, however, is limited to
those disclosures which a reasonable medical practitioner would make
under the same or similar circumstances. How the physician may best
discharge his obligation to the patient in this difficult situation involves
primarily a question of medical judgment. 5 4
Many of the cases following Natanson went along with the "doctor
knows best" notion by adopting either the physician standard,5 or
remaining non-committal on the applicable standard, 6 continuing the
prevailing notion that professionals within the medical field were better
equipped to determine the fate of patients.
Consider the 1966 case of Gray v. Grunnagle,57 which involved a
plaintiff with leg problems who was admitted to a hospital under the
services of an orthopedic surgeon named Dr. Blakeley. On the day he was
admitted, the plaintiff-patient was made to sign a consent form for58
surgery, even though tests to determine whether his condition required
surgery had in fact not yet been ordered, and the neurosurgeon,
defendant Dr. Jerome Grunnagle who ended up performing surgery on
him, had not yet been retained by Dr. Blakeley.5 9
53. Id. at 1106.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., DiFillipo v. Preston, 173 A.2d 333 (Del. 1961); Haggerty v.
McCarthy, 181 N.E. 2d 562 (Mass. 1962); Roberts v. Young, 119 N.W.2d 627
(Mich. 1963); Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668, (Mo. 1965); Kaplan v. Haines, 96
N.J. 242 (1968), overruled by Largey v. Rothman, 540 A.2d 504 (N.J. 1988); Nishi
v. Hartwell, 473 P.2d 116 (Haw. 1970), overruled by Carr v. Strode, 909 P.2d 489
(Haw. 1995).
56. See, e.g., Gray v. Grunnagle, 223 A.2d 663 (Pa. 1966).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 665 (noting that the defendant neurosurgeon, Dr. Grunnagle,
who performed what the jury determined was surgery without informed consent,
was brought into the matter and examined the plaintiff-patient on January 19,
2002]
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Evidence at trial further revealed that although the medical procedure
performed by Dr. Grunnagle, a laminectomy, was a major surgical
procedure involving a substantial risk of paralysis, which risk
materialized, rendering the plaintiff unable to walk,6° it was more
probable than not that the defendant physician did not advise the patient
of the attendant risks and alternatives to the procedure."
After consideration of the facts, the court held that
it is our opinion that a reasonable rule is that, where a physician
or surgeon can ascertain in advance of an operation alternative
situations and no immediate emergency exists, a patient should
be informed of the alternative possibilities and given a chance to
decide before the doctor proceeds with the operation."
Significantly, the court chose not to take advantage of the opportunity
to specify whether the standard of disclosure should be the physician
standard enunciated in Natanson v. Kline, or a patient standard yet to be
determined.
1960, even though the patient was admitted and signed a consent to surgery a day
earlier).
60. See id. at 673 (noting that testimony elicited from the defendant-
neurosurgeon revealed that the laminectomy was a major surgical procedure
carrying a 15 to 20 percent chance of paralysis, and that it was customary within
the medical community to inform patients of this major risk. The laminectomy
was described by Dr. Grunnagle as involving cutting several ligaments around the
spinal cord). See id. at 665-66 for a detailed description of the extent of cutting
which transpired during the laminectomy.
61. See id. at 665 for the text of the consent form. The consent form on which
Dr. Grunnagle allegedly relied for his authority to perform the laminectomy
neither contained risks inherent with the procedure, nor alternatives to the
procedure. Id. In addition, the patient expressly testified that he was not advised
of the nature of the surgery he was subjected to despite his nervous inquiry of a
resident physician and nurses, and his testimony was deemed credible by the
Court. Id. The court noted that "Mr. Gray's apprehension and continued
questioning of nurses and a resident physician certainly is indicative that he was
very uncertain of what surgical procedures were to be performed upon him. He
could not have consented, certainly, with any knowledge or understanding of an
impending operation on January 18, 1960, the date of his admission to the
hospital, and at which time neither diagnostic tests had been performed, nor had
surgery been discussed." Id. at 674. Equally important was the testimony of the
defendant physician that he could not recall advising the patient of the risks
attendant to the surgery. Id. at 673.
62. Id. at 670.
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The informed consent doctrine expanded by leaps and bounds after the
pronouncement in Salgo to the extent that by 1972 the doctrine had
permeated much of the United States.63 However, many jurisdictions
continually favored the paternalistic oriented physician standard.
64
Perhaps due to the expanding the judicial recognition of the physician
conspiracy of silence, which made it very difficult or impossible for many
patients to make out a prima facie case under the physician standard of
disclosure, many important decisions advocating a disclosure standard
based on the needs of a reasonable patient came down in the early 1970s.
For example, in 1971 the Pennsylvania Superior Court decided Cooper v.
Roberts65 and expressly adopted the reasonable patient standard of
disclosure in informed consent cases as the common law of Pennsylvania.
In adopting the reasonable patient standard, the Cooper court was greatly
influenced by a "community of silence" within the medical profession.6
Cooper involved a physician who perforated a patient's stomach while
performing a gastroscopic examination.6 7 The doctor had failed to inform
63. See Kurtz, Law of Informed Consent, supra note 2, at 1252.
Notwithstanding the acceptance of the informed consent doctrine in many states
by 1972, many jurisdictions stridently refused to adopt the doctrine. Perhaps, the
jurisdiction most impervious to the right of the patient to determine what was to
be done with his or her body was Georgia where that state's appellate courts
refused to adopt the doctrine until the year 2000 in the seminal case of Ketchup v.
Howard, 543 S.E. 2d 371, 373 (Ga. App. 2000) (observing "[A]ll of the states
except Georgia now recognize the informed consent doctrine. Since this court's
1975 decision in Young v. Yarn, [222 S.E.2d 113 (Ga. App. 1975)], Georgia has
not recognized any duty on the part of medical professionals to advise their
patients of the known material risks of a proposed treatment or procedure nor any
duty to advise of the availability of reasonable alternative treatments, thus
implicitly rejecting the common law doctrine of informed consent.").
64. See, e.g., DiFillipo v. Preston, 173 A.2d 333 (Del. 1961); Haggerty v.
McCarthy, 181 N.E. 2d 562 (Mass. 1962); Roberts v. Young, 119 N.W.2d 627
(Mich. 1963); Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668, (Mo. 1965); Kaplan v. Haines, 96
N.J. 242 (1968), overruled by Largey v. Rothman, 540 A.2d 504 (N.J. 1988); Nishi
v. Hartwell, 473 P.2d 116 (Haw. 1970), overruled by Carr v. Strode, 909 P.2d 489
(Haw. 1995).
65. 286 A.2d 647 (Pa. Super. Ct.1971).
66. See id. at 650 (stating "[a]s a practical matter, we must consider the
plaintiff's difficulty in finding a physician who would breach the 'community of
silence' by testifying against the interest of one of his professional colleagues.").
67. See id. at 648 (noting "[b]oth appellees described the nature of the
examination to appellant. However, there is no indication that she was ever
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his patient of the risks associated with using a fiberscope during such a
medical procedure. 68 The court recognized the difficulty of procuring
physicians within the community who would be willing to testify against
one of their colleagues on the information required to be disclosed prior
to this procedure, and it was aware of the fact that Gray v. Grunnagle
61
had not resolved the issue of which disclosure standard should be applied
under Pennsylvania law. The Superior Court held that equitable
considerations dictated the adoption of the reasonable patient standard
under which the physician must disclose "all those facts, risks and
alternatives that a reasonable man in the situation which the physician
knew or should have known to be the plaintiff's would deem significant in
making a decision to undergo the recommended treatment."7 °
For whatever reason, Cooper v. Roberts did not inspire jurisdictions to
adopt the reasonable patient standard of disclosure. However, the
celebrated case of Canterbury v. Spence," which some commentators
erroneously credit with first announcing the patient standard,72 may have
been the lightning rod for the adoption of the reasonable patient standard
of disclosure by many jurisdictions. 3 The pertinent facts in Canterbury, in
informed of any collateral risks, of perforation or otherwise." According to the
opinion, "[t]he device used for the gastroscopic examination of appellant was a
fiberscope, a fiberglass instrument, about one-quarter inch diameter containing
some 150,000 glass fibers. The fiberscope could be lowered into the stomach of a
patient to photograph that area for purposes of diagnosis and treatment." Id.
68. See id. (noting "[t]here was no dispute among the parties that the cause of
the perforation was in fact the gastroscopic examination.").
69. 223 A.2d 663 (Pa. 1966).
70. Cooper, 286 A.2d at 650. The Court emphasized "[als the patient must
bear the expense, pain and suffering of any injury from medical treatment, his
right to know all material facts pertaining to the proposed treatment cannot be
dependent upon the self-imposed standards of the medical profession." Id.
71. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See Krause, supra note 8, at 271
(highlighting Canterbury as "perhaps the most well-known of all American
informed consent cases").
72. See, e.g., Richard A. Heinemann, Note: Pushing the Limits of Informed
Consent: Johnson v. Kokemoor and Physician-Specific Disclosure, 1997 Wis. L.
REV. 1079, 1080 (1997) (erroneously observing that Canterbury v. Spence first
articulated the patient-based standard of informed consent); Suzanne K. Ketler,
Notes & Comments: The Rebirth of Informed Consent: A Cultural Analysis of the
Informed Consent Doctrine After Schreiber v. Physicians Insurance Co. of
Wisconsin, 95 NW. U. L. REv. 1029, 1037 (2001).
73. See Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass'n, 465 A.2d 294, 300 (Conn. 1983)
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the words of the Court of Appeals, were depressing.74 Equally depressing,
and profoundly illustrative of the paternalism of some within the
judiciary, were the trial court's directed verdicts in favor of all the
defendants in the case."
The facts of Canterbury show that in December 1958, nineteen year-old
Jerry Canterbury, a clerk-typist for the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
76began to experience severe pain between his shoulder blades. He
consulted with defendant-neurosurgeon, Dr. William Spence, after prior
consultations with two general practitioners and prescription medications
failed to relieve his pain.77 Dr. Spence's extensive physical examination
and a subsequent x-ray failed to pin-point the cause of the patient's severe
pain, prompting Dr. Spence to order a diagnostic medical procedure
known as a myelogram.8 The myelogram revealed a filling defect within
the region of the fourth thoracic vertebra. Dr. Spence recommended a
surgical procedure known as a laminectomy to determine the cause of the
71aberration.
9
Prior to the surgery on February 11, 1959, almost two years after the
decision in Salgo,8° Dr. Spence failed to advise either the patient or the
(observing that the leading case of Canterbury "was given a generally favorable
reception by the judiciary," leading eight states to also adopt the physician
standard of informed consent).
74. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 776 (noting "[T]he record we review tells a
depressing tale.").
75. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case-in-chief, the trial court granted
both defendants' motions for a directed verdict. See id. at 778-79. A directed
verdict is similar to a non-suit, and is normally granted when the party with the
burden of proof, usually the plaintiff, fails to prove the elements of his or her
cause of action. See, e.g., Emmanuel 0. Iheukwumere, Application of the
Corporate Negligence Doctrine to Managed Care Organizations: Sound Public
Policy or Judicial Overkill?, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 585, n.159 (2001)
[hereinafter Iheukwumere, Corporate Negligence Doctrine] (referencing Pa. R.
Civ. P. 230 and 230.1, and Fed. R. Civ. P. 41).
76. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 776.
77. See id.
78. See id. According to the opinion, a myelogram is "a procedure in which
dye is injected into the spinal column and traced to find evidence of disease or
other disorder." Id.
79. See id.
80. See Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Tr., 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1957).
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81patient's mother of the one percent risk of paralysis from the surgery.
Approximately one day after the laminectomy surgery the patient fell out
of bed while attempting to relieve himself while completely left
unattended and unassisted by hospital personnel. 8 Several hours after the
fall the patient suffered complete paralysis from the waist down. Later
that evening, Canterbury underwent surgery to restore some control over
the muscles below the waist. Despite the surgery, Canterbury was unable
to void properly and required constant care from a urologist. Nine years
later, Canterbury continued to suffer from urinal incontinence and
paralysis of the bowels. As a result, Canterbury needed the assistance of
crutches to walk and had to wear a penile clamp. 8'
Mr. Canterbury brought suit against Dr. Spence and the Washington
Hospital alleging, among other causes of action, negligent performance of
the laminectomy, negligent post-operatic care, and Dr. Spence's violation
of the informed consent doctrine by his failure to warn of the one percent
risk of paralysis from the laminectomy.84 For some inexplicable reasons,
save an inability to secure any expert witness willing to bridge the
community of silence to testify against one of their own,8' plaintiff-patient
"introduced no evidence to show medical and hospital practices, if any,
customarily pursued in regard to the critical aspects, and only Dr. Spence,
called as an adverse witness, testified on the issue of causality."
8 6
However, Dr. Spence conceded that he did not inform the patient of
the one percent risk of paralysis because "communication of that risk to
the patient is not good medical practice because it might deter patients
from undergoing needed surgery and might produce adverse
81. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 794, n.138.
82. See id. at 777 (noting that the patient indicated a need to void, and was
given a receptacle by the hospital nurse, who then left without assisting the
patient, even though by the patient's apparently uncontradicted testimony, the
hospital bed had no side rail to prevent a fall). According to the opinion, "[T]he
one fact clearly emerging from the otherwise murky portrayal by the record,
however, is that the appellant did fall while attempting to void and while
completely unattended." Id. n.4.
83. See id. at 777-78.
84. See id. at 778.
85. See id. n.124 (observing "[o]ne of the chief obstacles facing plaintiffs in
malpractice cases has been the difficulty, and all too frequently the apparent
impossibility, of securing testimony from the medical profession") (emphasis
added, internal citations omitted).
86. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 778.
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psychological reactions which could preclude the success of the
operation." 87 Significantly, Dr. Spence testified that the paralysis could
have been due to both the surgery and trauma.88 Despite Dr. Spence's
admissions and the immediate onset of the paralysis after the patient's fall
from his hospital bed while completely unattended, the trial judge granted
both Dr. Spence's and the hospital's motions for a directed verdict. Citing
the plaintiff's alleged failure to introduce medical evidence of negligence
in the performance of the laminectomy, and the plaintiff's failure to
introduce medical testimony on the relationship between the patient's fall
and his subsequent paralysis, the trial judge granted the motions.89 The
issue of consent was not addressed in the trial court's ruling.90
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed and
remanded for a new trial on all counts.9 Addressing the issue of consent,
the Court of Appeals held "[tihe testimony of appellant and his mother
that Dr. Spence did not reveal the risk of paralysis from the laminectomy
made out a prima facie case of violation of the physician's duty to disclose
which Dr. Spence's explanation did not negate as a matter of law."
92
Responding to Dr. Spence's contention that the one percent risk of
paralysis was immaterial, thus foreclosing disclosure,93 the court
countered, stating that "[a] very small chance of death or serious
disablement may well be significant; a potential disability which
dramatically outweighs the potential benefit of the therapy or the
detriments of the existing malady may summons discussion with the
patient."94 The court then examined the history of consent in American
jurisprudence, and observed: "To the physician, whose training enables a
self-satisfying evaluation, the answer may seem clear, but it is the
prerogative of the patient, not the physician, to determine for himself the
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 779 (observing "The [trial] judge did not allude specifically to
the alleged breach of duty by Dr. Spence to divulge the possible consequences of
the laminectomy.").
91. Canterbury, 464 F.2d 772.
92. Id.
93. According to the opinion, Dr. Spence termed the risk of paralysis from
the laminectomy "a very slight possibility." Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 778 (emphasis
in the original).
94. Id.
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direction in which his interests seem to lie." 95
Emphasizing that the scope of the physician's disclosure to the patient
must be measured by the amount of information that a patient needs to
make an intelligent choice, the court observed that "a risk is thus material
when a reasonable person, in what the physician knows or should know to
be the patient's position, would be likely to attach significance to the risk
or cluster of risks in deciding whether or not to forego the proposed
therapy." 96 The court then held that where an issue of informed consent
arises, the physician must communicate to the patient "the inherent and
potential hazards of the proposed treatment, the alternatives to that
treatment, if any, and the results likely if the patient remains untreated."97
Justifying its emphasis on the informational needs of the patient, and
not on what the physician only feels is necessary to disclose, the
Canterbury court appropriately noted the difficulty of patients in
overcoming the community of silence among physicians, as did Cooper v.
Roberts." Both courts correctly emphasized that respect for the patient's
right of control over his or her own body strongly militated in favor of a
judicially imposed standard rather than one arbitrarily set by the members
of the medical community, particularly since in attempts to exonerate one
of their own from liability, physician silence may be mistaken for a non-
existent custom in any particular case. 99 Further, Canterbury correctly
noted the inherent paternalism in allowing physicians to determine what
is adequate information for an informed decision.1° Following in the
footsteps of Canterbury, many jurisdictions soon adopted the patient
95. Id. at 781.
96. Id. at 787 (citing Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64
Nw. U.L. REV. 628, 640 (1970)).
97. Id. at 787-88.
98. See Cooper, 286 A.2d at 650; see generally Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 772.
99. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 783-84 (regarding the dangers inherent in
making disclosure dependent on medical custom, the court warned "We sense the
danger that what in fact is no custom at all may be taken as an affirmative custom
to maintain silence.").
100. Id. at 786 (observing that "[a]ny definition of scope [of disclosure] in
terms purely of a professional standard is at odds with the patient's prerogative to
decide on projected therapy himself. That prerogative, we have said, is at the very
foundation of the duty to disclose, and both the patient's right to know and the
physician's correlative obligation to tell him are diluted to the extent that its
compass is dictated by the medical profession.").
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standard of disclosure.'0°
However, despite Canterbury's celebrated status and the force of its
criticism against the physician standard of disclosure, and a nationwide
trend towards the patient standard,' °2 the physician standard has retained
its resiliency and remains the majority view. °3 This is particularly true in
those jurisdictions where the informed consent doctrine has been adopted
by statute.1°4 Notwithstanding the constant battles for supremacy between
the physician and patient standards, one of the major developments. in the
informed consent jurisprudence since Canterbury has been the focus on
the type of information which is material, warranting disclosure by the
physician. The court in Canterbury found a one percent risk of paralysis
from a laminectomy material, warranting disclosure.
IV. MATERIALITY AND THE EVOLUTION OF
DISCLOSABLE INFORMATION
Recognizing the necessity of a balance between the informational
needs of the patient and the placement of a limit on the disclosure
obligation of the physician, the Canterbury court wisely formulated the
rule of disclosure in terms of materiality, instead of unduly burdening the
physician with the obligation of disclosing all risks, no matter how trivial,
101. See Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass'n, 465 A.2d 294, 300 (Conn. 1983)
(noting the adoption of the patient standard by many jurisdictions soon after
Canterbury).
102. See Carr v. Strode, 904 P.2d 489, 499 (Haw. 1995) (noting a "growing
nationwide trend favoring the patient-oriented standard"). In Carr the Hawaii
Supreme Court overruled its decision in Nishi v. Hartwell, 473 P.2d 116 (Haw.
1970), which had adopted the physician standard of disclosure, and expressly
adopted the patient standard. Carr, 904 P.2d at 499. In Carr, the court harshly
criticized the physician standard as antithetical to the patient's right of autonomy,
and stressed its paternalistic underpinnings. Id.
103. See Porch, supra note 20, at 596 (observing that the patient standard
remains the minority view among the states). See also Ketchup v. Howard, 543
S.E.2d 371, 378 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that the majority of states retain the
physician standard, although emphasizing that "almost as many states adhere to
the lay [patient] standard.").
104. See Kurtz, supra note 2, at 1252.
105. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 779 (holding that the plaintiff's and his
mother's testimony that Dr. Spence did not disclose a one percent risk of paralysis
from a laminectomy, made out a prima facie case of violation of the informed
consent doctrine, requiring a new trial).
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attendant upon a recommended procedure. °6 Canterbury's materiality
formulation has quickly gained support in other jurisdictions, and appears
to be the benchmark on disclosable information.
Subsequent to Canterbury many important informed consent decisions
came down addressing the materiality of information in divergent ways,
which included, among other factors, the percentage of the risk occurring
and the severity of the harm should the risk materialize. Consider the
case of Wilkinson v. Vesey,07 decided the same year as Canterbury, where
the Rhode Island Supreme Court first addressed and adopted the
informed consent doctrine.1°8 The facts and trial court rulings in Vesey
epitomized medical and judicial indifference to the plight of the suffering
patient. In 1951, 33-year-old patient, Mrs. Winifred Wilkinson, described
in the opinion as then in very good health,'" began experiencing radiating
pains in her hands, arms, and legs. Upon consulting her family physician,
she was advised to enter the Roger Williams General Hospital and was
106. See id. at 787. Although Canterbury framed the requirement of
disclosure in terms of information which a reasonable patient (objective standard)
would find material to whether or not to proceed with a medical procedure, at
least one court has expressly rejected the reasonable person approach, deeming it
an encroachment on the patient's right of self-determination. See Scott v.
Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 559 (Okla. 1979) (observing that the reasonable person
approach of Canterbury "certainly severely limits the protection granted an
injured patient," and holding "[a]ccordingly, we decline to jeopardize this right by
the imposition of the 'reasonable man' standard."). In addition, some
commentators have highlighted the reasonable patient standard as too restrictive
to the extent it impacts on the patient's right of self-determination. See, e.g.,
Seidelson, Medical Malpractice: Informed Consent Cases in "Full Disclosure"
Jurisdictions, 14 DuQ. L. REv. 309 (1976); Katz, Informed Consent - A Fairy Tale?
Law's Vision, 39 U. Pmn. L.REV. 137 (1977). Although the Scott court and these
commentators certainly make a good point that the requirement of "reasonable
patient" impacts on the patient's right of self-determination, I believe that the
Canterbury approach is eminently justified as a means of balancing the interest of
the patient while recognizing the dilemma of physicians who must deal with
patients with varying informational needs and idiosyncrasies. A subjective
approach leaves the physician too much at the mercy of a disgruntled patient with
an ax to grind and the benefit of hindsight.
107. 295 A.2d 676, 687 (R.I. 1972).
108. Id. at 690 (observing that "this is the first time that we have considered
the doctrine of informed consent.").
109. Id. at 680.
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later referred to the defendants, radiologists Drs. Vesey and Hunt." The
defendants' radiographic studies of Mrs. Wilkinson were inconclusive
regarding a suspicion of cancer.1' Neither doctor ordered a biopsy, which
. 112
was necessary to determine the presence or absence of a malignancy/ 113
and to confirm the need for deep radiational therapy. The defendants
not only initiated deep radiational therapy but also failed to inform the
patient of the risks attendant. In addition, the defendants failed to
employ the necessary anatomical diagram helpful to insuring the absence
of an overlap in the radiational exposure, which the defendants admitted
during trial, was essential.'1 The result of these breaches, which the
defendants' own trial testimonies established, was that by the time of trial
Mrs. Wilkinson had suffered eight operations, the removal of her clavicle,
sternum and seven ribs, and endured the surgical movement of her heart
and its cushioning by muscles taken from her left arm. These were the
alleged consequences of deep radiation therapy for a suspected malignant
tumor, which never existed, and was not ruled out by an available
110. Id.
111. See id. at 681.
112. See id. at 683 (observing that defendant, Dr. Hunt, conceded that at the
time of the procedure at issue, a biopsy "was a recognized diagnostic procedure."
The patient's plastic surgeon and pathologist "made it quite clear that a biopsy
supplies conclusive proof of whether or not a tumor is or is not malignant.").
113. Wilkinson, 295 A.2d at 682 (noting that "[b]oth defendants testified that
they would not recommend the x-ray therapy given Winifred unless they were
'convinced' that she had cancer.") (emphasis on convinced in the original).
114. See id. at 684.
The defendants explained that in order to insure no
[radiational] overlap, it was essential that the filter [radiation
beams] be centered exactly in the middle of the field of
exposure every time the treatment was given. Doctor Hunt
explained that they employed no anatomical diagram to mark
the areas of the body that were to be exposed to the radiation.
Id.
Even more alarming, and clearly indicative of the radiologists lack of concern for
precision, which was apparently absolutely essential to the treatment, was the fact
that neither one made a mark on the patient's body to note where the beam had
been lowered in order to avoid re-exposure to the same site, and to warn the
other. See id.
115. Id. at 681.
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diagnostic procedure.'
1 6
Notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence of negligence and the
physician's failure to advise Mrs. Wilkinson of the risks attendant upon
the deep radiation therapy, the trial judge granted the defendant's motion
for a directed verdict apparently on all the claims."' The court cited the
plaintiff's failure to adduce expert testimony to prove her case, despite the
then existing adverse witness statute of Rhode Island that allowed a party
to prove his or her case through the expert testimony of the adverse
. 18party.18
Addressing the informed consent claim on appeal, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court adopted the materiality requirement of Canterburyn 9 and
noted the difficulty patients faced in securing experts who would testify
against one of their own. 1E° Further, the court made one of the most
compelling statements in informed consent jurisprudence, i.e., that "[t]he
keystone of this doctrine is every competent adult's right to forego
treatment, or even cure, if it entails what for him are intolerable
consequences or risks however unwise his sense of values may be in the
eyes of the medical profession, or even the community. '121 The Vesey
court also emphasized that "the greater the risk, the greater the duty to
inform.
, 122
116. See id. at 681, 683-84 (noting that a biopsy of all the tissues and bones
removed from the patient subsequent to the deep radiation therapy showed no
evidence of cancer).
117. See id. at 680 (observing that "[a] jury trial was held in the Superior
Court [trial court]. At the end of eight days of testimony, the plaintiffs concluded
their case. At that juncture, the trial justice first refused them permission to
amend their complaints and then granted the defendants' motion for a directed
verdict."). For an explanation of a directed verdict see supra note 75 and
accompanying text.
118. See Wilkinson, 295 A.2d at 682 (noting that "the trial justice overlooked
the fact that plaintiff called both defendants as adverse witnesses," each of whom
was an expert in his specialty, in violation of R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-17-14 (1969),
which allowed a party to establish the applicable standard of care through the
testimony of an adverse witness).
119. Id. at 688 (emphasizing "the patient is entitled to receive material
information upon which he can base an informed consent.").
120. See id. at 687.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 690, quoting MORRIS AND MORITZ, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND
THE LAW (5h ed. 1971).
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Other cases decided after Canterbury such as Cobbs v. Grant,12' Logan
v. Greenwich Hospital Association, and Hartke v. Mckelway, added
their weight and authority to the materiality requirement of Canterbury.
Hartke, for instance not only sanctioned the materiality standard, but
epitomized the Vesey admonition that the greater the risk, the greater the
duty to inform. In Hartke, the plaintiff-patient was prone to numerous
and traumatic gynecological and pregnancy related medical problems.
26
She became pregnant after undergoing a sterilization procedure known as
a laparoscopic cauterization, which she had been told would foreclose any
more pregnancies. 12' The patient sued, contending, among other things,
that her physician breached the informed consent doctrine by failing to
inform her of a .1%-.3% risk of pregnancy after the laparoscopic
cauterization. 1' The jury agreed and awarded judgment to the plaintiff.
129
On appeal, the defendant-physician argued "that he had no duty to
disclose the risks of pregnancy in this case since no 'reasonable person in
what the physician [knew] or should [have known] to be the patient's
position would be likely to attach significance to the risks in deciding
whether to accept or forego the proposed treatment.'
130
The court - the same court which decided Canterbury eleven years
earlier - observed that the risk of pregnancy in this case would be
123. 502 P.2d 1 (1972). In Cobbs the Supreme Court of California held that a
physician was obligated to advise the patient of not only the risks inherent upon a
recommended procedure, but also of the risks of foregoing a recommended
procedure. Id. at 10.
124. 465 A.2d 294 (Conn. 1983). In Logan the Connecticut Supreme Court
for the first time addressed the doctrine of informed consent "as a basis for
malpractice liability of a physician," and echoed the Canterbury reasoning that the
patient, not the medical profession, is better suited to determine what should be
done with his or her body, and sharply criticized the physician standard of
disclosure as impinging on the right of self-determination of the patient.
Significantly, in this case the court held that a physician was obligated to disclose
to the patient an alternative procedure which was arguably more hazardous than
the one performed. Id.
125. 707 F.2d 1544 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
126. Id. at 1548.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1549.
129. See id. at 1546.
130. Id. at 1548 (quotation in the original) (internal citation omitted).
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considered very small by most people,13" ' but rejected the physician's
argument on appeal on the grounds that he knew or should have known
that any risk of pregnancy subsequent to the procedure was of great
concern to the patient.1 32 The court focused on the materiality of any risk
of pregnancy whatsoever to this special patient who appeared to have
considered the risk of pregnancy a matter of life and death.'33
In the 1990s, perhaps as a result of the invariability of death from the
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome ("AIDS"), its association
originally with traditionally disfavored groups and the intolerable social
stigma which infection with AIDS invited,"' courts began to address the
materiality of risks of factors external to, and not inherent in, medical
procedures such as the potential Human Immunodeficiency VirusS 135
("HIV") infection of patients from their doctors. The three cases
analyzed herein show the split among the courts on the materiality of
potential infection from practitioner to patient.
ESTATE OF BEHRINGER v. THE MEDICAL CENTER AT
PRINCETON'
In early June 1987, plaintiff, Dr. Behringer, an attending surgeon at the
131. Id. at 1549.
132. See id. at 1548-49 (emphasizing that defendant Dr. McKelway had
conclusive evidence of the significant risk of subsequent pregnancy to the patient
based on these factors: (1) defendant knew that the patient had a history of
frequent and traumatic gynecological, and pregnancy related problems; (2) he
knew that she contracted a severe infection known as peritonitis after her first
delivery by Caesarean section, suffered an ectopic pregnancy, and had been
hospitalized numerous times for minor gynecological procedures; and (3) he had
been informed by the patient, apparently before the procedure that several
physicians had opined that she would not likely survive another pregnancy.
Significantly, the patient's boyfriend had indicated to Dr. McKelway his
willingness to undergo a vasectomy if there was a chance that the patient's
sterilization would be unsuccessful).
133. See id.
134. See generally Iheukwumere, supra note 5 (discussing the inevitability of
death from AIDS infection, the stigma of infection and arguing that HIV infected
physicians involved in invasive procedures have both a legal and ethical obligation
to disclose their infection status to patients despite indications that the risk of
physician to patient infection is very small).
135. HIV is the virus that causes AIDS. See id. at 715-16.
136. 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991).
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defendant Medical Center ("Center"), became ill and was admitted to the
Emergency Room ("ER"). His treating physician examined him upon
admission, and determined that he needed to undergo a diagnostic
procedure known as a bronchoscopy."3  Results of the bronchoscopy
revealed that Dr. Behringer was infected with AIDS. Somehow news of
Dr. Behringer's AIDS diagnosis reached the president of the Center, who
promptly canceled Dr. Behringer's pending surgical cases. Subsequent to
the Center president's action, the Center's board of trustees voted to
require HIV positive surgeons to disclose their infection status to their
patients prior to surgery."' At the conclusion of several months of intense
consultations between the medical and dental staff, hospital
administration, and the board of trustees, the Center adopted a measure
prohibiting any HIV positive practitioner from performing any
"procedures that pose any risk of HIV transmission to the patient."'3 9
Based on this measure Dr. Behringer's surgical privileges were
suspended.' 40
Dr. Behringer filed suit against the Center, alleging, among other
claims, that "1) the risk of transmission of HIV from surgeon to patient is
too remote to require informed consent, and 2) the law of informed
consent does not require disclosure of the condition of the surgeon."'' 41 In
addressing Dr. Behringer's allegations the Court emphasized:
It is this court's view that the risk of transmission is not the sole
risk involved. The risk of a surgical accident, i.e., a needle stick
or scalpel cut, during surgery performed by an HIV-positive
surgeon, may subject a previously uninfected patient to months
or even years of continual HIV testing. Both of these risks are
sufficient to meet the Jansen standard of "probability of harm"'
142
137. A bronchoscopy is a medical diagnostic procedure involving bronchial
washings to establish the presence or absence of Pneumocystis Carinii Pneumonia
("PCP"). A positive indication of PCP conclusively establishes the presence of
AIDS. See Iheukwumere, supra note 5, n.69, citing Estate of Behringer, 592 A.2d
at 1255.
138. See Estate of Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1258.
139. Id. at 1259-1260.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1279. In addition, Dr. Behringer alleged that the measure which
requires HIV positive surgeons to disclose their status to their patients prior to
surgery violated the New Jersey statutory prohibition against discrimination. Id.
142. Jansen v. Food Circus Supermarkets, 541 A.2d 682, 688 (N.J. 1988).
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and the Largey"W standard requiring disclosure.
The court observed that an "infected surgeon, even if the virus
drastically shortens his surgical career, can be expected to perform
numerous operations. Assuming that the surgical patient's risk is
exceedingly low (1/130,000), the risk that one of his patients will contract
HIV becomes more realistic the more operations he performs. 1 4' The
court then held that "[iun assessing the materiality of risk, this court
concludes that the risk of accident and implications thereof would be a
legitimate concern to the surgical patient, warranting disclosure of this
risk in the informed consent setting., 146 In addition, the court stressed
that "[a] reasonably prudent patient would find information that his
physician is infected with HIV material to his decision to consent to a
seriously invasive procedure because the potential harm is severe and the
risk, while low, is not negligible.,
147
FAYA V. ALMARAZ
148
Two years after Estate of Behringer, the issue of the materiality of a
physician infected with AIDS came before the Maryland Court of
Appeals. The facts in Faya v. Almaraz reveal that one year after being
diagnosed with AIDS, defendant Dr. Rudolf Almaraz, an oncological
surgeon with operating privileges at Johns Hopkins Hospital ("Hospital")
in Baltimore performed invasive surgeries on the plaintiffs Sonya Faya
and Perry Mahoney Rossi respectively, at the Hospital. 9
Dr. Almaraz failed to advise the plaintiffs of his AIDS status.5
However, three weeks after Dr. Almaraz died from AIDS'-related
complications the plaintiffs learned of his AIDS infection from a local
newspaper.1 5 1 The plaintiffs then initiated a suit against Dr. Almaraz's
143. In Largey v. Rothman, 540 A.2d 504, 505 (N.J. 1988), the New Jersey
Supreme Court adopted the reasonable patient standard, and overruled Kaplan v.
Haines, 232 A.2d (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967), which had made the prudent
physician standard applicable in New Jersey.
144. See Estate of Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1279.
145. Id. at 1280.
146. Id. (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 1283.
148. 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993).
149. Id. at 329.
150. Id. at 333.
151. Id. at 329.
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estate, his practice group, and the Hospital for compensatory and punitive
damages. Plaintiffs alleged, among others, that Dr. Almaraz breached his
duty under the informed consent doctrine by failing to advise them of his
112AIDS infection prior to the surgeries.
The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' action for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted, on the grounds that the plaintiffs
failed to sufficiently allege actual exposure to the AIDS virus, and
perhaps, more importantly, tested negative for the virus.15a On appeal, the
Court of Appeals held: "we cannot say as a matter of law that no duty was
imposed upon Dr. Almaraz to warn the appellants of his infected
condition or refrain from operating upon them.'
54
Justifying its holding, the court noted that an important premise
underlying the duty to inform is the foreseeability of a potential harm."'
The court then stressed "[u]nder the allegations of the appellants'
complaints, taken as true, it was foreseeable that Dr. Almaraz might
transmit the AIDS virus to his patients during invasive surgery.' 56
Addressing the defense's argument that the risk of physician to patient
transmission is a remote risk, the court observed that "legal scholars have
long agreed that the seriousness of potential harm, as well as its
probability, contributes to a duty to prevent it."'
KERINS V. HARTLEY'58
In Kerins v. Hartley, the California Court of Appeals for the Second
District, in reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the
defendant obstetrical surgeon, held that a legally cognizable battery
action existed where a patient-plaintiff testified that the defendant
performed an invasive procedure on her despite his HIV seropositivity,
combined with the fact that her consent was predicated on the defendant's
good health. 9 On remand from the California Supreme Court, the court
held that recovery was not possible as a matter of law when a plaintiff's
152. Id. at 330.
153. Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d. 327, 330-331 (Md. 1993).
154. Id. at 334.
155. Id. at 327.
156. Id. at 333.
157. Id. at 333. (emphasis added).
158. 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172 (Cal. App. 1994).
159. Id. at 174 (citing Faya v. Amaraz, 620 A.2d. 327 (Md. 1993)).
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fear of contracting AIDS during a lengthy surgical procedure under a
seropositive physician was not "corroborated by reliable medical or
scientific opinion, that her risk of developing AIDS has significantly
increased and has resulted in an actual risk of AIDS that is significant.'
6
The court's about-face after the remand from the Supreme Court
appears justified by the facts of the case. The pertinent facts revealed that
approximately five days after performing an invasive procedure on the
plaintiff to remove a tumor, the defendant received the results of a test
showing that he was HIV positive. 16 ' Approximately a year and half later,
the defendant-physician filed a discrimination lawsuit against his partners
when they refused to allow him to return to his surgical practice. 16' He
announced on television that he had AIDS. 63 Shortly after viewing the
news conference the plaintiff underwent testing for HIV. The result came
back negative for the virus.
Despite the negative result, and the fact that the defendant received
test results five days after the plaintiff's surgery showing that the
defendant had tested positive for HIV, the plaintiff sued the defendant,
alleging, among others, that her consent to the surgery had been vitiated
by the defendant's failure to inform her of his seropositive HIV status.
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment,
holding as a matter of law that the defendant had not committed a battery
upon the plaintiff.166 On appeal, the Court of Appeals, citing the rationale
of Faya v. Almaraz,16' held that the plaintiff had set forth a legally
cognizable cause of action with her assertion of the fear of contracting
AIDS.16' However, on remand from the California Supreme Court, the
intermediate appellate court held that the plaintiff's fear of developing
AIDS was unreasonable as a matter of law, and that she could not recover
on her battery claim.9
160. Id. at 181. (emphasis added).
161. Id. at 174.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 175.
165. Id. at 180.
166. Kerins, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 180.
167. 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993).
168. See Kerins, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 174.
169. Id. at 181.
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V. THE RELEVANCE OF PHYSICIAN EXPERIENCE TO A
VALID INFORMED CONSENT: SELECTED CASES
In the 1990s, while the potential for physician to patient transmission of
AIDS infection was receiving judicial and scholarly attention, the
materiality of physician experience in the context of informed consent
began to percolate. In Kaskie v. Wright,'70 the Pennsylvania Superior
Court confronted the issue of whether or not the defendant surgeon
breached the informed consent requirement by failing to advise the
parents of his minor patient prior to surgery of his alcoholism, and lack of
a Pennsylvania medical license.17' Addressing this issue, the Superior
Court agreed with the trial court that the physician's alcoholism was not a
material issue requiring disclosure, and affirmed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment to the defendants. 171
Kaskie held that to expand the informed consent doctrine to include
disclosure of matters personal to the treating physician such as alcoholism
would take the doctrine "into realms well beyond its original
boundaries.' The informed consent issue, however, may not have been
the main reason, which influenced the court to affirm the trial court.
Rather, the Kaskie court may have been persuaded that the plaintiffs'
action was filed after the running of the applicable statute of limitations,
174
and refused to accept the plaintiffs' fraudulent concealment argument.
75
170. 589 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
171. See id. at 214 ("[a]ppellants... claimed that informed consent was
lacking, as they had not been told prior to permitting the operation on their son
that Dr. Stewart was an alcoholic and unlicensed to practice medicine in
Pennsylvania.").
172. Id. at 213.
173. Id. at 217.
174. See id. at 215 ("[t]here is no dispute here that the action was commenced
beyond the two year limitations period set by 42 Pa. [C.S.A.]5524(2)."). See also
id. at 216 ("the patient, or in this case his representatives, does not need to know
the precise extent of the alleged injuries before the statute of limitation on
informed consent will run. Here appellants knew the child died. At that time
medical negligence would have been apparent and/or could have been
discovered.").
175. See id. at 215.
Appellants contend.., that appellees are estopped from
advancing the statute [of limitations] as a defense, arguing that
the statute is tolled by the appellees' failure to provide them
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To the extent Kaskie implied that matters personal to a physician are
irrelevant to the requirements of the informed consent doctrine, such
implication is not only misplaced, but is contradicted by the same
Pennsylvania Superior Court's opinion in Cooper v. Roberts176 which held
that prior to a surgical procedure the physician must disclose "all those
facts, risks and alternatives that a reasonable man in the situation which
the physician knew or should have known to be the plaintiff's would deem
significant in making a decision to undergo the recommended
treatment. Certainly, the fact of a physician's alcoholism would be of
significant concern to a reasonable patient, since an alcohol impaired
physician, or one likely to be impaired during an invasive procedure
would impact on the likelihood of a mistake during the procedure.
In 1996, the Wisconsin Supreme Court raised the ante on the
materiality of risks of factors external, not inherent, to medical-surgical
procedures with its audacious and well-reasoned ruling in Johnson v.
Kokemoor.17" The relevant facts were set forth by the court as follows:
following bouts of headaches, the plaintiff underwent a CT scan
diagnostic test. Apparently aided by the results of the CT scan, the
defendant doctor diagnosed "an enlarging aneurysm at the rear of the
plaintiff's brain and recommended surgery to clip the aneurysm." 179
However, prior to the recommended surgery, involving clipping the
aneurysm classified as a basilar bifurcation aneurysm,'° reputed as one of
the most difficult surgical undertakings in all of neurosurgery, the
plaintiff allegedly asked the defendant how many times the defendant had
performed the contemplated surgery.'2 The defendant indicated that he
with information which, had it been in their possession at the
time of their son's death, would have led them to file suit
earlier. This failure is characterized as fraudulent concealment
which in turn resulted in lack of informed consent.
176. 286 A.2d 647 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971).
177. Id. at 650.
178. 545 N.W. 2d 495 (Wisc. 1996).
179. See id. at 498.
180. See id. at 499 n.10.
181. See id. at 505 (noting that "The plaintiff also introduced evidence that
surgery on basilar bifurcation aneurysms is more difficult than any other type of
aneurysm surgery and among the most difficult in all of neurosurgery."),
182. Id. at 499.
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had performed the surgery dozens of times. ' The fact, according to the
opinion, however, was that:
The defendant had relatively limited experience with aneurysm
surgery. He had performed thirty aneurysm surgeries during
residency, but all of them involved anterior circulation
aneurysms. According to the plaintiffs experts, operations
performed to clip anterior circulation aneurysms are
significantly less complex than those necessary to clip posterior
circulation aneurysms such as the plaintiff's. Following
residency, the defendant had performed aneurysm surgery on
six patients with a total of nine aneurysms. He had operated on
basilar bifurcation aneurysms only twice and had never operated
on a large basilar bifurcation aneurysm such as the plaintiffs
184
aneurysm.
In addition to overstating his experience with the surgery, evidence
revealed that the defendant reviewed medical literature prior to the
surgery and was aware of the substantial morbidity and mortality risks
attending the procedure. Even so, he failed to inform the patient of the
levels of risk of death or serious impairment for this particularly difficult
surgery. Evidence showed that when this procedure was performed by a
physician with the defendant's level of experience, the risks were actually
closer to thirty percent, instead of the two percent represented by the
defendant.18 Further, evidence showed that the defendant failed to advise
the plaintiff that a tertiary care center was the appropriate setting for her
difficult surgical procedure, since such a center had the necessary
experienced neurosurgeons and facility.'87
183. Id.
184. Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
185. Id. at 506. The defendant also admitted at trial that he had not shared
with the plaintiff information from articles he reviewed prior to surgery. These
articles established that even the most accomplished posterior circulation
aneurysm surgeons reported morbidity and mortality rates of fifteen percent for
basilar bifurcation aneurysms. Furthermore, the plaintiff introduced expert
testimony indicating that the estimated morbidity and mortality rate one might
expect when a physician with the defendant's relatively limited experience
performed the surgery would be close to thirty percent. Id.
186. Id. at 499.
187. Id. at 509 (noting "[a]rticles from the medical literature introduced by
the plaintiff also stated categorically that the surgery at issue should be performed
at a tertiary care center while being 'excluded' from the community setting
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Although the defendant clipped the aneurysm, "rendering the surgery a
technical success," 'm and the plaintiff dismissed her negligent treatment
claim prior to trial,'89 as a result of the surgery "the plaintiff, who had no
neurological impairments prior to surgery, was rendered an incomplete
quadriplegic. She remains unable to walk or to control her bowel and
bladder movements. Furthermore, her vision, speech and upper body
coordination are partially impaired."'' 9
During the liability phase of the bifurcated trial,' 91 the trial court
admitted, as relevant to the plaintiff's informed consent, the following
evidence: (1) the defendant's relative lack of experience; (2) his failure to
refer the plaintiff to a tertiary care center; and (3) his failure to advise the
plaintiff of the statistical percentage of morbidity and mortality for a
basilar bifurcation aneurysm surgery when performed by an experienced
surgeon, as opposed to one performed by a surgeon with the defendant's
• 192
level of experience. Significantly, the defendant's experts conceded that
the risk of the surgery was two to five times the figure represented by the
defendant to the plaintiff,193 and admitted that they would divulge their
level of experience with a particular procedure if questioned by a
patient.9 4 The jury concluded that the defendant failed to adequately
inform the plaintiff of the risks associated with her surgery, and that a
reasonable patient, if fully informed of the risks of the surgery, would
have withheld consent from the defendant. 195
because of 'the limited surgical experience' and lack of proper equipment and
facilities available in such hospitals.") (emphasis in the original).
188. Id. at 499.
189. Id. at 506.
190. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d at 499.
191. Id. at 497 n.1
192. Id. at 497.
193. Id. at 500. Whereas the defendant had represented the risk of morbidity
and mortality attendant upon the surgery at two percent, his experts placed the
risk at between five and ten percent. Id.
194. Id. (stressing that "[tlhe defendant's expert witnesses also testified that
when queried by a patient regarding their experience, they would divulge the
extent of that experience and its relation to the experience of other physicians
performing similar operations.") Id. On the issue of referral, one of the
defendant's experts conceded that "it certainly is reasonable for [the defendant] to
explain to [the plaintiff] that other surgeons are available" (alteration in original).
Id. at n.15.
195. Id. at 497.
Doctor, Are You Experienced?
On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court's evidentiary rulings
. . 196
constituted an abuse of discretion. A split court of appeals agreed with
the trial court on the materiality, admissibility of the defendant's relative
lack of experience, and the morbidity and mortality comparative risk
data. I However, the court reversed on the issue of the defendant's
failure to refer the plaintiff to a tertiary care center, holding that
"evidence about the defendant's failure to refer the plaintiff to more
experienced physicians was not relevant to a claim of failure to obtain the
plaintiff's informed consent."'98
The state supreme court confronted three issues, i.e., whether the
defendant-neurosurgeon breached the informed consent doctrine by: (1)
not disclosing to the patient prior to the difficult brain surgery the
neurosurgeon's limited experience in the performance of such surgery; (2)
failing to advise the patient of the rate of morbidity and mortality for this
particular procedure between surgeons with his level of experience and
more experienced surgeons; and (3) not referring the plaintiff-patient to a
tertiary care center staffed with physicians more experienced in the
• 199
particular type of surgery.
Calling the issues presented one of first impression before the court and
noting the lack of appellate cases on point, the supreme court sided
entirely with the evidentiary rulings of the trial court, and reversed the
201
court of appeals on the referral issue. Citing the applicable statutory
provision, Wisconsin Stat. Section 448.30, which provides that "[a]ny
physician who treats a patient shall inform the patient about the
availability of all alternate, viable modes of treatment and about the
benefits and risks of these treatments,"'02 the court rejected the
defendant's proposed bright line rule precluding the admission of
evidence of a physician's level of experience as a matter of law in
informed consent matters.2°3 The court also rejected the defendant'sproposed bright line rule on the morbidity and mortality comparative risk
196. Id.
197. Id. at 498.
198. Id. at 498.
199. See Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d. at 497.
200. Id. at 498.
201. Id. (holding "We conclude that all three items of evidence were material
to the issue of informed consent in this case.").
202. Id. at 501 (citing Wis. STAT. § 448.30 (1997)).
203. Kokemoor, 545 N.W. 2d at 504.
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data.2 '
The court noted that the statutory doctrine of informed consent in
Wisconsin was based on the materiality standard of Canterbury v.
Spence0 5 and required the disclosure of "all of the viable alternatives and
risks of the treatment proposed. '2" 6 The court then reiterated that its
207prior opinion in Martin v. Richards had already rejected the defendant's
argument that the statutory disclosure requirement was limited to risks
inherent to a treatment option.2 0 The court held:
In this case information regarding a physician's experience in
performing a particular procedure, a physician's risk statistics as
compared with those of other physicians who perform that
procedure, and the availability of other centers and physicians
better able to perform that procedure would have facilitated the
plaintiff's awareness of "all of the viable alternatives" available
to her and thereby aided her exercise of informed consent. We
therefore conclude that under the circumstances of this case, the
circuit court [trial court] did not erroneously exercise its
209discretion in admitting the evidence.
This article is mainly concerned with the Kokemoor court's decision to
allow evidence of a physician's level of experience in informed consent
matters on a case-by-case basis. The court's analysis of disclosure of
comparative risk data and of physician referrals where appropriate
centers are available for a patient's recommended procedure are beyond
the scope of this article's discussion. However, this author applauds the
Kokemoor court's holdings on these other issues.
Some commentators greeted the Kokemoor decision with alarm, and
attacked its foundation as unsound.2' ° They failed to see it as a necessary
204. Id. at 506.
205. See id. at 502.
206. Id. (quoting Martin v. Richards, 531 N.W.2d 70 (Wis. 1995)).
207. 531 N.W. 2d 70 (Wis. 1995).
208. See Kokemoor, 545 N.W. 2d at 505 (observing that "[tihe Martin court
rejected the argument that Wis. Stat. [§] 448.30 was limited by its plain language to
disclosures intrinsic to a proposed treatment regimen.").
209. See id. at 498 (alteration in the original).
210. See, e.g., Richard A. Heinemann, Pushing the Limits of Informed
Consent: Johnson v. Kokemoor and Physician-Specific Disclosure, 1997 Wis. L.
REV. 1079, 1080-81 (1997) (calling the doctrinal foundation of the opinion
ambiguous, and asserting that the "new disclosure requirements are not
sufficiently tailored to the reality of how contemporary health care is delivered.")
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evolution of the informed consent doctrine. Reactions from other
jurisdictions to Kokemoor were splintered. A year after the ruling in
Kokemoor the intermediate appellate court in Washington State declined
to hold that a physician's level of experience was material to informed
consent.21 In Whiteside v. Lukson,2 evidence revealed that prior to
obtaining the patient's consent for the removal of the patient's gallbladder
via a method known as a laparoscopy, the defendant had only performed
the procedure on three pigs, and never on a human."' Defendant failed to
advise the patient of this fact.1 During the plaintiff's procedure the
defendant misidentified the bile duct and damaged it resulting in multiple
. . 215
complications. The patient sued, alleging lack of informed consent on
account of the defendant's failure to disclose his lack of experience inS 216
performing the procedure. The jury agreed with the plaintiff's
o 217
contentions, and rendered a verdict in her favor. The trial judge,
however, determined that the defendant's lack of experience was not a
material fact requiring disclosure, and consequently granted the defense'sI. 218
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The court of appeals
affirmed, on the ground that such a requirement was expansive, and that
the state of Washington still adheres to a 'traditional approach' which
only requires disclosure of facts "which relate to the proposed
treatment., 219 Strangely enough, the court failed to explain why the
physician's lack of experience was not material information relating to the
procedure.
On the opposite side of Whiteside, both the Delaware Supreme Court
in Barriocanal v. Gibbs220 and the highest state court of Maryland in
Dingle v. Belin221 embraced the rationale of Kokemoor. In Barriocanal,
the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in
211. Whiteside v. Lukson, 947 P. 2d 1263 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
212. 947 P. 2d 1263 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
213. Id. at 1264.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Whiteside, 947 P.2d at 1263-640.
219. Id. at 1265.
220. 697 A.2d 1169 (Del. 1997).
221. 749 A.2d 157 (Md. 2000).
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precluding the testimony of the plaintiffs' expert.2 2 The facts in this case
show that on April 19, 1992 the defendant Dr. Martin Gibbs performed
brain aneurysm surgery on the plaintiffs' decedent, Mrs. Emiliana
223Barriocanal. During the surgery Dr. Gibbs clipped the decedent's right
distal internal carotid artery instead of the aneurysm. The clipping of the
carotid artery caused the decedent to suffer a massive cerebral injury,
224
resulting in her death. Pretrial the plaintiffs' expert opined that Dr.
Gibbs deviated from the standard of care regarding informed consent by
not disclosing prior to the procedure that he had not performed aneurysm
surgery recently. 2' Defense counsel filed a motion in limine to exclude
the plaintiffs' informed consent testimony on the basis that the expert
"had not unequivocally stated that this type of information is customarily
given to patients in order to secure their informed consent.2 2 6
The trial court in Barriocanal granted the defense's motion in limine
and excluded the testimony of the plaintiffs' expert on informed
consent. 227 The plaintiffs filed a petition for reconsideration of the ruling,
and attached therein a letter from their expert expressly stating, among
other things, that "Dr. Gibbs should have conveyed the paucity of his
recent aneurysm surgery including no such operations in the prior year.",22
8
Although the record on appeal does not indicate whether the trial court
ruled on the petition, the trial court excluded the plaintiffs' evidence on
informed consent at trial. 2 ' Following a verdict for the defendant, the
plaintiffs moved for a new trial, alleging, among other things that based
on Kokemoor, the trial court improperly excluded their evidence on
informed consent relating to the experience of the defendant-
neurosurgeon with aneurysm surgery. 23 The trial court denied the motion
for a new trial.
23 1
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court held that it was reversible
222. Barriocanal, 697 A.2d at 1172-73.
223. Id. at 1170.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1171.
230. See Barriocanal v. Gibbs, No. 94C-04-044, 1996 Del. Super. Ct. LEXIS
283, at * 8-9 (July 3, 1996) (trial court opinion).
231. Id.
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error to exclude the opinion of the plaintiffs' expert regarding the
necessity of the defendant's disclosure "of his recent aneurysm surgery. 232
By so holding, the court at worst implicitly, and at best, expressly adopted
the rationale of Kokemoor regarding the necessity of physician
experience to a valid informed consent.
In Dingle v. Belin,23' plaintiff Deborah Belin underwent gall bladder
surgery under the care of defendant-surgeon Dr. Lenox Dingle. During
the surgery fourth year resident physician Dr. Magnuson who was
assisting Dr. Dingle, dissected the gall bladder and took it out.
2 34
However, during the dissection of the gall bladder Dr. Magnuson
dissected the bile duct instead of the cystic duct, resulting in the drainage
of bile into the plaintiff's abdomen. As a result of the bile drainage into
the plaintiff's abdomen she had to undergo extensive corrective surgery,
and suffered much pain and discomfort. 25
Ms. Belin filed suit alleging, among other claims, that Dr. Dingle
breached the informed consent doctrine by allowing the resident, Dr.
Magnuson, to play a very active role in the surgery, i.e., by allowing her to
do the cutting, clamping, and stapling. In support of her breach of
consent claim, Ms. Belin alleged that prior to the surgery she received
assurances from Dr. Dingle that he would perform the surgery "and only
use a resident to assist him as was absolutely necessary."23 6 Further, Ms.
Belin testified that she insisted on Dr. Dingle doing the actual surgery
because, as a surgical technician at the same hospital, she knew that
surgeons allowed residents to play a major part in surgery as part of the
teaching process.23
After the presentation of evidence, the trial judge's instruction to the
jury apparently merged the negligence claim with the informed consent
claim. 28 Perhaps as a result of the merging of the two claims, the verdict
sheet simply asked the jury whether Dr. Dingle was negligent in causing
the plaintiff's injuries, without distinguishing between negligence in the
performance of the surgery, and negligence in failing to obtain the
232. Barriocanal, 697 A.2d at 1172.
233. 749 A.2d 157 (Md. 2000).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 160.
238. Id. at 162.
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plaintiff's informed consent.239 The jury answered in the negative and
returned a verdict for Dr. Dingle.' 4°
On appeal to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, the informed
consent claim was essentially treated as a breach of contract action.241 In a
split decision, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals found the plaintiff's
242claim meritorious. The court of appeals granted certiorari "principally
to consider whether a physician who, as part of his or her contractual
undertaking with a patient, agrees to an allocation of tasks between the
physician and other physicians, may be liable for breach of contract if that
agreement is violated., 243 Noting that the relationship between a doctor
and a patient which results in a malpractice action is ordinarily a
contractual one, the court observed that due to the potentially greater
recovery under a tort action, i.e., availability of damages for pain,
suffering, and disfigurement, "malpractice actions have traditionally been
tort-based, the tort arising from the underlying contractual
relationship.",244 In addressing the plaintiff's claim, the court stressed that
although
claims based on lack of informed consent usually involve
allegations that the physician failed to make adequate
disclosure of a material risk or collateral effect of the
contemplated procedure or of an available alternative
not carrying that risk or effect, the duty is not so limited.
Risks, benefits, collateral effects, and alternatives
normally must be disclosed routinely, but other
considerations, at least if raised by the patient, may also
need to be discussed and resolved.245
In support of this statement the court cited, among others,
Kokemoor.'46 The Court then held that in surgical procedures, which may
involve collaborations between the chosen surgeon and other medical
professionals who may be unknown to the patient, the chosen surgeon
must discuss and resolve with the patient the identity of which persons
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 163.
244. Id. at 164 (internal citation omitted).
245. Id. at 165 (emphasis added).
246. Id.
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will be performing aspects of the surgery, if the identity of those persons is
important to the patient.21 The court emphasized that
[d]espite Dr. Dingle's protestation to the contrary, a
physician who agrees to a specific allocation of
responsibility or a specific limitation on his or her
discretion in order to obtain the consent of the patient to
the procedure and then, absent some emergency or other
good cause, proceeds in contravention of that allocation
or limitation has not obtained the informed consent of
248the patient.
In 2001, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Duttry v. Patterson
24 9
and expressly repudiated the holding of Kokemoor regarding the
materiality of disclosure of physician experience in the informed consent
setting. Plaintiff Cloma Duttry was diagnosed with esophageal cancer in
210February 1989. Soon after, she consulted with defendant, Dr. Lewis T.
Patterson, who recommended surgical intervention." During the surgical
consultation, Mrs. Duttry allegedly asked Dr. Patterson about his
experience with the recommended procedure and specifically inquired
how many times he had in fact performed that type of surgery. 2  Dr.
Patterson responded that he had performed the recommended surgery
251
about once a month for the past five years.
On June 5, 1989, Dr. Patterson performed the suigery, after which
serious complications arose that required a subsequent emergency
251
surgery. Complications from the June 5, 1989 surgery permanently
247. Id. at 166.
248. Id.
249. 771 A.2d 1255 (Pa. 2001).
250. Id. at 1256.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1256-57 (stating "[plaintiff] Duttry claims that she questioned
[defendant] Patterson about his experience in performing the type of operation he
recommended.").
253. Id. ("Patterson allegedly told Duttry that he had performed this
particular procedure approximately once every month."). In particular, see id. at
1260, observing that the defendant advised the plaintiff that he had performed the
procedure about sixty times, when in reality he had performed it only nine times
(Nigro, J)(dissenting opinion).
254. See id. at 1257. The surgery on the plaintiff-patient involved a resection
of portions of her esophagus and stomach. Three days subsequent to the
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damaged the plaintiff's lungs, resulted in development of a serious
medical condition known as adult respiratory disease syndrome and
255
rendered her unable to work.
Mrs. Duttry and her husband sued Dr. Patterson and his practice
group, alleging medical malpractice and lack of informed consent. At
trial the plaintiffs attempted to introduce evidence showing that Dr.
Patterson had performed the relevant surgery only nine times in the
preceding five years, contrary to his representation of a figure close to
sixty.116 The trial judge held the evidence inadmissible on the ground that
it was irrelevant to a claim of informed consent. The jury returned a
2561
verdict for the defense. On appeal the superior court reversed and
remanded for a new trial.25 9 The superior court held that evidence relating
to Dr. Patterson's experience in performing the surgery was relevant to
the informed consent claim.26
On further appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court framed the issue
as "whether the Superior Court erred as a matter of law when it
determined that information concerning a surgeon's personal
qualifications and experience is relevant to an informed consent claim.
2 61
Calling the superior court's holding an "expansive approach," the
supreme court observed that the common law approach to informed
consent in Pennsylvania has traditionally been limited.262 Rejecting the
procedure a leak developed at the surgical site, and then progressed to a rupture,
necessitating an emergency surgery. See id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 1257.
257.
The trial court ruled that this evidence was inadmissible because it was
not relevant to the issue of informed consent. It reasoned that the only
information that a physician must impart to a patient to obtain informed
consent is information relative to the risks of the procedure itself. The
trial court therefore concluded that as information regarding the personal
skills and abilities of the physician is not relevant to understanding the
risks of the procedure itself, then such information need not be conveyed
in order to deem the patient's consent as being informed.
Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1257.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 1258 (stating that "[t]he expansive approach taken by the Superior
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rationale of Kokemoor, the court held that "information personal to the
physician, whether solicited by the patient or not, is irrelevant to the
doctrine of informed consent., 263  Justifying its holding, the court
emphasized that adoption of the superior court's approach and that of
Kokemoor would result in a redundant cause of action, since the
inexperience of a physician and a physician's deception may be the basis
• • 264
for other grounds of action such as misrepresentation.
In a strong dissenting opinion Justice Russel Nigro argued that it is
unreasonable to deem the consent informed when such consent was
procured by the physician's gross exaggeration of his experience.265 More
importantly, Justice Nigro argued that information regarding a physician's
experience with a surgical procedure would certainly be considered
266
material by a reasonable patient, thus warranting disclosure.
VI. THE RELEVANCE OF PHYSICIAN EXPERIENCE TO A
VALID INFORMED CONSENT: ANALYSIS
This article contends that it defies logic to assert that the experience of
a physician is immaterial to a patient's informed consent. Since the
patient must bear the expense, pain, and suffering of any medical
procedure, he or she is certainly entitled to know before consenting
whether the physician wielding the scalpel has only practiced ther 267
procedure on animals, as was the case in Whiteside v. Lukson, or is truly
experienced in the performance of the particular procedure. Any
Court below is in opposition to this Commonwealth's traditional view that the
doctrine of informed consent is a limited one.").
263. Id. at 1259.
264.
While we acknowledge that the learned high courts of some of
our sister states have broadened their concept of the informed
consent doctrine, we see no compelling reason to follow a
similar course. As discussed infra, plaintiffs such as Appellees
have recourse against allegedly inexperienced and deceptive
physicians via other causes of action. We see no need to alter
this commonwealth's definition of informed consent in order to
provide what will often be a redundant cause of action.
Id. at 1259.
265. See id. at 1260.
266. Id.
267. 947 P.2d 1263 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
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contention that a reasonable patient would consider his or her physician's
level of experience immaterial to a procedure, particularly an invasive
procedure, is clearly contradicted by real life experiences. This point was
borne out in Taylor v. Albert Einstein Medical Center.16 In Taylor, the
defendant pediatrician determined that the 16-year-old patient needed a
diagnostic invasive procedure known as a Swan-Ganz catheterization to
better assess her increasingly deteriorating condition.2 69  The minor's
parents questioned the defendant-pediatrician about his level of
experience in performing the highly technical invasive procedure. 270 Upon
learning of his relative lack of experience with the procedure, the parents
withheld consent resulting in the appearance of a board-certified
271cardiologist to carry out the procedure. Unwittingly, however, the
pediatrician apparently neither informed the parents that he would
perform the procedure while being monitored and assisted by the more
experienced cardiologist, nor advised the cardiologist that the parents
272expected the cardiologist to perform the procedure. The tragic result
was that the young patient died while the defendant-pediatrician was
271performing the major portion of the procedure.
The patient's autonomy to decide what should be done with his or her
own body, and which surgical hands should wield the scalpel over his or
her body, is at the center of the informed consent doctrine. This fact was
well recognized in Wilkinson v. Vesey 274 where the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island wisely emphasized the point that "[T]he keystone of this
doctrine is every competent adult's right to forego treatment, or even
cure, if it entails what for him are intolerable consequences or risks
however unwise his sense of values may be in the eyes of the medical
profession, or even the community, '275 and stressed that "the greater the
risk, the greater the duty to inform. 276  If the reasoning behind such
268. 723 A.2d 1027 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998), rev'd in part on other grounds,
Taylor v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 754 A.2d 650 (Pa. 2000).
269. Id. at 1029.
270. Id. at 1030.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 1033.
273. Id. at 1034.
274. 295 A.2d 676 (R.I. 1972).
275. Id. at 687.
276. Id. at 690, quoting MORRIS AND MORITz, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND
THE LAW 217 (5h Ed. 1971).
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regressive rulings as Whiteside and Duttry is the judicial fear that
disclosure of a physician's level of experience will discourage patients
from consenting to treatment by certain inexperienced physicians, the
judiciary is well-advised to pay heed to Vesey's point that it is the right of
the patient to forego treatment, or even cure, if the consequences of a
contemplated procedure are likely to be intolerable.
A physician who. is experienced with a particular procedure will
invariably be better at performing that procedure, and will in all
likelihood obtain a better result. This point is well-recognized by the
medical community which requires that physicians undergo extensive
internships in medical school, and residency training upon graduation
from medical school prior to independently practicing without
supervision. Even physicians qualified to practice without supervision
realize the importance of experience particularly in serious procedures.
Hence the various medical specialty boards would not consider certifying
a physician until such a physician has practiced for a certain period of
time and/or performed a certain number of procedures.277 It certainly is
reasonable, as shown by Dingle v. Belin278 to respect a patient's decision
that her medical fate not be placed in the hands of a physician undergoing
277. See The American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology Rules, available
at http://www.abog.org/women/defs.html (last visited April 10, 2002). The rules
provide in pertinent part that in order to be certified "a physician must pass a
written test to demonstrate that he or she has obtained the special knowledge and
skills required for medical and surgical care of women," and an oral examination
"given by a team of well-respected national experts; the exam tests the physician's
skills, knowledge and ability to treat different conditions. The examiners also
review the patients the physician treated during the past year."; see also, Rules and
Procedures of The American Board of Orthopaedic Surgery, available at
http://www.abos.org/newbuttons.htm (last visited April 10, 2002). The rules
pertaining to certifying examinations provide that in order for a physician to
become board-certified, he or she must have (1) passed the written test [called
Part I of the examination] after successful completion of 60 months of post-
doctoral residency, and (2) passed the practice exam [called Part II of the
examination], which has as a prerequisite to its taking, the requirement that the
applicant "must be continuously and actively engaged in the practice of operative
orthopaedic surgery other than as a resident or fellow (or its equivalent) for at
least 22 full months immediately prior to the Part II examination." It further
provides that the practice "must include hospital admitting and surgical privileges
(temporary privileges acceptable) in effect at the time of application and at the
time of examination."
278. 749 A.2d 157 (Md. 2000).
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training. Even the defendant's own medical experts in Kokemoor tacitly
agreed with this point when they acknowledged that if a patient inquired
they would advise her of the presence of physicians more experienced
with her procedure." 9 It defies logic and common sense to take away the
right of a patient to consider a physician's experience before going under
the surgical knife, particularly when the patient takes the time, and
musters the courage to inquire.
Considering physician experience immaterial to informed consent
smacks of pre-Salgo judicial paternalism (physician knows best). For
even in situations such as those in Duttry and Whiteside, it is obvious that
some physicians know better than others. Declaring physician experience
immaterial in Duttry and Whiteside is tantamount to a judicial burying of
the head in the sand. It ignores the medical reality that complex medical
procedures such as surgical removal of aneurysms and lumbar fusion
surgeries, among other procedures, are operator dependent. Successful
outcomes of such procedures are greatly influenced by the experience of
the surgeon. By refusing to consider the experience of the attending
physician material to informed consent, courts could be assuring the
inexperienced practitioner a pool of patients, and thus preserving his or
her livelihood, but such decisions clearly run the risk of protecting and
encouraging medical secrecy.' The physician's inexperience or other
personal characteristics such as chronic drug dependency and abuse may
be withheld from the patient to his or her utter detriment.1
81
The Duttry court's position is unpersuasive where it states that the
recognition of physician experience as essential to a valid informed
consent claim would result in a redundant cause of action.' An analysis
of Duttry's admonition in a previous article shows that a
279. See Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W. 2d 495, 500 (Wis. 1996).
280. See, e.g., Barry R. Furrow, Doctors' Dirty Little Secrets: The Dark Side of
Medical Privacy, 37 WASHBURN L. J. 283, 308 (1998) (analyzing the dangers of
medical secrecy and observing that the defendant-physician in Johnson v.
Kokemoor "misrepresented the statistical risks [confronting the plaintiff]
deliberately for the sake of his own benefit, that is, a chance to perform the
surgery. He concealed a secret, lying to induce a patient to allow him to perform
surgery.") (citation omitted).
281. See Iheukwumere, supra note 75, at 615 (observing that although
legislatures play important roles in safeguarding patients from negligent acts and
omissions, the judiciary has an equal role in protecting the interest of patients).
282. See Duttry v. Patterson, 771 A.2d 1255, 1259 (Pa. 2001).
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misrepresentation or negligence cause of action under Pennsylvania law is
neither equivalent to, nor synonymous with an informed consent action,
• 281
which is treated as a battery under Pennsylvania and Tennessee law.
Although Duttry correctly observed that a misleading statement by a
physician can form the basis for a misrepresentation action, and may even
support a negligence action, informed consent, misrepresentation, and
negligent actions under Pennsylvania law carry different burdens of proof,
and require different elements for a prima facie case. First, unlike a
purely medical negligence action where the plaintiff, through expert
testimony, must show a breach of the prevailing standard of care, and a
causal connection between the breach and the plaintiff's injury,28 once it
is shown in a battery action that the physician engaged in the unlawful
touching of the patient, i.e., performed a surgical procedure without
consent, the plaintiff is entitled to recovery of damages, even if the
procedure was performed entirely in accordance with the prevailing
standard of care.Y Second, a misrepresentation action, unlike a battery
action, requires a detrimental reliance by the plaintiff in order to
recover.2 Therefore, it is clear that a battery action, which the superior
283. See Emmanuel 0. Iheukwumere, Culmination of a Trend in Limiting the
Scope of Informed Consent?; Duttry v. Patterson, 73 PA. B. ASS'N Q. 21 (January
2002). Pennsylvania law regards an informed consent action as a battery. See,
e.g., Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.2d 647, 649 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971) (emphasizing that
an operation without the patient's informed consent is a technical assault).
Currently, only two states, Pennsylvania and Tennessee consider informed
consent actions as battery instead of negligence actions. See Bryan J. Warren,
Comment: Pennsylvania Medical Informed Consent Law: A Call to Protect Patient
Autonomy Rights by Abandoning the Battery Approach, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 917, 933
n.138 (2000).
284. See, e.g., Grabowski v. Quigley, 684 A.2d 610, 615 (Pa. Super. Ct. v. 1996)
(noting "it is generally the case that expert medical testimony is required to
support a claim of medical malpractice. In the usual medical malpractice case, the
requirement is two-fold: 1) to establish whether the physician breached the
standard of professional care, and 2) to establish the causal nexus between the act
and the injury.").
285. See id. (observing "because the theory of recovery is battery, Appellant
need not establish that the surgery was performed in a negligent manner. In other
words, "said surgery could have been done perfectly, and could even have had a
beneficial effect on the patient, yet a cause of action could still exist; for it is the
very conduct of the unauthorized procedure which constitutes the tort[]" quoting
Moure v. Raeuchle, 604 A.2d 1003, 1008 (Pa. 1992)).
286. See, e.g., Baker v. Cambridge Chase, Inc., 725 A.2d 757 (Pa. Super. Ct.
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court's approach in Duttry would have allowed, is not synonymous with
either a negligence or misrepresentation action under Pennsylvania law.
In the context of legal practice, many jurisdictions consider experience
so material to effective legal representation, particularly in homicide
cases, which involve risks of lengthy incarceration or the death penalty,
that before a judge could appoint a lawyer for an accused the lawyer must
demonstrate that he or she has either tried major felony cases as the lead
counsel and/or been in practice for a substantial period of time.' 8' Is the
life of a patient going under a surgeon's knife any less worthy than that of
a criminal defendant?
Along with the goal of maximizing patient safety, common sense and
public policy also militate in favor of requiring a physician to truthfully
disclose his or her experience, particularly when the patient inquires. A
patient's direct inquiry is certainly indicative of the importance the patient
attaches to the level of experience of the hand that will wield the scalpel.
Also, truthful disclosure of physician experience may result in less
litigation. Just as in the practice of law, it may encourage less experienced
physicians to refer more difficult cases to their more experienced peers,
thus arguably resulting in better care for patients. The goal of patient
safety and the need for a better health care system requires a balance
between protecting the interest of the physician and the safety and
autonomy interests of the patient such that courts should be mindful of
imposing too many disclosure obligations upon physicians.""
The rulings in Duttry and Whiteside are neither surprising, nor
unexpected, in light of the history of judicial paternalism chronicled in the
early sections of this article. For one reason or another, the judiciary,
particularly in some jurisdictions, appears overly protective of the medical
community, and correspondingly, almost indifferent to the autonomy
interests of patients. Note how long it took to get from the recognition of
1999); Bortz v. Noon, 729 A.2d 555 (Pa. 1999).
287. See, e.g., PHILA. CRIM. R. 406-1, available at
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/judicial-council/local-
rules/philadelphia/philadel_08cp-criminal.pdf. (last visited Apr. 6, 2002)
(providing that before a judge may appoint a lawyer lead counsel in a homicide
case, the lawyer must show, among other things, at least five years criminal trial
experience; service as sole or lead counsel in at least ten jury trials of serious and
complex cases, and experience in the use of expert testimony and evidence).
288. See Iheukwumere, supra note 75, at 617 (stressing in the context of
managed cost containment in the utilization review process).
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basic consent in Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital9 in 1914 to
informed consent in Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of
Trustees290 in 1957. However, despite the wrong-headed refusals in cases
such as Duttry and Whiteside, to recognize physician experience as
material to a valid informed consent, the reality is that patients consider
experience material. The common sense position that experience is
material, as evidenced in Taylor v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 1 and
the compelling legal commentary in Kokemoor will result in an eventual,
if reluctant, judicial about face, just as the courts experienced in moving
from mere consent to informed consent.
CONCLUSION
Judicial recognition of the right of the patient to not only basic consent,
but informed consent to medical procedures was a long and tedious
process, which was probably hampered by strident physician opposition to
the sharing of treatment decision with the patient. However, since Salgo
first adopted the concept of informed consent, and Canterbury placed its
judicial imprimatur on the patient standard of disclosure, much progress
has been made in the evolution of the doctrine. The decision in
Kokemoor is a necessary evolution of the informed consent doctrine,
which made explicit that which common sense, logic, and legal and
medical practice already recognize, i.e., experience is material. Although
Duttry and Whiteside refused to recognize this reality, it is predicted that
judicial recognition of the soundness of Kokemoor's rationale by cases292 . 293
such as Barriocanal v. Gibbs,'92 and Dingle v. Belin, and continuing
scholarly commentary on the necessity of physician experience to a valid
informed consent, and better medical care, will turn the tide in favor of
requiring physicians to truthfully disclose their experience levels with
certain medical procedures, particularly when queried by patients.
289. 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
290. 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).
291. 723 A.2d 1027 (Md. 1998), rev'd in part on other grounds, 754 A.2d 650
(Pa. 2000).
292. 697 A.2d 1169 (Del. 1997).
293. 749 A.2d 157, 165-66 (Md. 2000).
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